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Abstract
Using an empirical gravity model, I estimate the contribution of changes in relative labor 
supply to bilateral migration in the 2000s and apply the resulting estimates to project future 
bilateral fl ows based on population forecasts by the United Nations. I extend the work of 
Hanson and McIntosh (2016) by including non-OECD destinations and project international 
migration fl ows for the whole world. In contrast to their fi ndings, and despite of the slowdown 
of population growth in Latin America, the US will face sustained immigration pressures 
because of strong population growth in other regions of the world, leading to a projected 
immigrant stock that grows for decades to come. For the world as a whole, international 
migrants are projected to increase from 2.8% of total world population in 2010 to 3.5% in 
2050, with a substantial increase of migrants originating from India and Sub-Saharan Africa.
Keywords: international migration, gravity model, population growth.
JEL classifi cation: F22, J61.
Resumen
En este trabajo se estima la contribución del crecimiento demográfi co a la migración bilateral 
por medio de un modelo gravitacional y se utilizan los resultados para proyectar fl ujos 
migratorios basados en las previsiones de crecimiento demográfi co de las Naciones Unidas. 
Para ello se extiende la metodología de Hanson y McIntosh (2016), y se incluyen países de 
destino que no pertenecen a la OCDE, para así obtener proyecciones para prácticamente 
todos los países del mundo. En contraposición con los resultados de Hanson y McIntosh, 
y a pesar del menor crecimiento demográfi co esperado en América Latina, Estados Unidos 
continuará expuesto a presiones inmigratorias a causa del fuerte crecimiento demográfi co 
en otras regiones del mundo. También se proyecta un incremento del número de migrantes 
a nivel global, de 2,8 % de la población mundial en 2010 a 3,5 % en 2050, fundamentado 
en un aumento sustancial de migrantes provenientes de la India y el África subsahariana.
Palabras clave: migración internacional, modelo gravitacional, crecimiento demográfi co.
Códigos JEL: F22, J61.
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1 Introduction
Both immigration and emigration flows play an important role in shaping a country’s popula-
tion. However, in comparison to the evolution of the native population, which can be projected
using birth rates and death rates that evolve smoothly over time, the evolution of migration is
more difficult to anticipate, and projections of population often assume excessively simplistic
dynamics for the evolution of international migration flows. For example, the widely used pop-
ulation projections by the United Nations (World Population Prospects. The 2015 Revision)
assume that net migration flows will remain constant at their current level until 2050 and
that migration flows then decline gradually to reach 50% of this level in 2100 (United Nations,
2015).
The objective of this work is to provide a framework to project migration flows and stocks
in future decades in a richer framework that is based on long-term population pressures and
bilateral migration determinants, such as geographical distance and cultural proximity mea-
sures. These projections are a valuable input to construct migration and population scenarios
that are, in turn, useful to project long-term potential growth rates of particular countries and
to evaluate the impact on economic policy of a changing population structure.
Past research suggests that, in addition to economic disparities, population pressure that builds
up because of the birth of large cohorts of future workers intensifies outward migration as
these workers enter the labor force (Hatton and Williamson, 2003). Hanson and McIntosh
(2016) use this idea to project international migration flows for selected OECD countries
available in the DIOC database (Dumont and Lemaˆıtre, 2005; OECD, 2008).1 In this paper,
I extend their work to virtually all countries in the world. I do so by estimating an enriched
bilateral gravity model of international migration that ties migration flows to the relative
evolution of population growth rates in origin and destination countries. In comparison to the
methodology of Hanson and McIntosh (2016), who project future migration flows for a limited
sample of OECD country destinations using cohort-specific bilateral migration data, I show how
through equation averaging their method can be generalized for constructing projections for any
arbitrary destination country by removing the need for cohort-specific migration observations.
For the United States I find that immigration pressures do not subside, despite of the slowdown
of population growth in Latin America, and in particular in Mexico, the primary origin of
immigrants. Immigrants from Mexico in the US are projected to be replaced by immigrants
from other regions of the world. This result stands in contrast with the findings by Hanson
and McIntosh (2016), who project a stagnating immigrant stock in the US. I show that the
discrepancy is partly explained by the inclusion of non-OECD countries that lower the estimate
of the influence of population growth rates on bilateral migration flows.
1DIOC stands for Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries.
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For the world as a whole, I project international migrants to increase from 2.8% of total world
population in 2010 to 3.5% in 2050. The total stock of migrants is projected to grow from
190 million in 2010 to 334 million in 2050. In terms of origins, India and countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa explain a large part of the increase in the number of total migrants whereas
former USSR countries and countries in Eastern Europe are projected to reduce the number
of migrants they supply.
The paper is structured as follows: I present the specification that I estimate to produce the
projections and show how it can be derived from the cohort-based specification by Hanson
and McIntosh (2016) in Section 2. In Section 3, I describe international migration patterns
and highlight the importance of non-OECD countries as hosts of large stocks of international
migrants. In Section 4, I report the results of the estimation as well as projections for several
countries and for the whole world. In Section 5, I discuss how the methodology of this paper
can be applied and highlight some of the caveats of the resulting projections. I conclude in
Section 6.
2 Methodology
My baseline specification is directly derived from the specification estimated by Hanson and
McIntosh (2016) for OECD destinations. Their specification requires the observation of re-
peated cohort-specific migration rates, which are only available for OECD countries (from the
DIOC database). However, if their specification is averaged over cohort-gender cells, then the
need for cohort-specific migration rates disappears. The advantage of this averaged specifica-
tion is that it requires data that are less granular and can therefore be estimated for a wider
set of countries, using the Global Bilateral Migration database from the World Bank.
2.1 Specification
In the baseline specification, the change in the bilateral migration rate is related to changes in
birth cohorts, relative GDP levels, and geographical distance variables τ i in the following way:
msd,t+1 −msd,t = ηs + ηd + λ
(
ln
L0s,t−1
L0s,t−5
− ln L
0
d,t−1
L0d,t−5
)
+ κ
(
ln
GDPs,T0
GDPd,T0
)
+ γiτ
i
sd
+ φi
[(
ln
L0s,t−1
L0s,t−5
− ln L
0
d,t−1
L0d,t−5
)
× τ isd
]
+ sd, (1)
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where time t is measured in decades. The outcome of interest is the change in the bilateral
migration rate after a decade: msd,t+1 − msd,t, where msd,t is the fraction of the population
from the source country s that resided in the destination country d in decade t and msd,t+1 is
the fraction of the population from the source country s that resided in the destination country
d a decade later, in t+ 1.
On the right hand side, the variables ηs, and ηd are fixed effects for origin and destination
countries and they absorb time trends that are specific to a particular country. The variable(
ln
L0s,t−1
L0s,t−5
− ln L
0
d,t−1
L0d,t−5
)
is the difference in the growth rate of birth cohorts over four decades.
This difference captures the change in the relative abundance of workers in the source and des-
tination countries. Assuming, as Hanson and McIntosh (2016) do, that virtually all emigration
decisions occur between the ages of 15 and 54, the growth of a birth cohort between t− 5 and
t− 1 measures the growth in the number of people who were born in years that put them into
that age group. So, for example, if t = 2000 and t + 1 = 2010, then the growth rate ln
L0s,t−1
L0s,t−5
measures the growth rate of birth cohorts between t − 5 = 1950, when those aged 35-54 in
2000 were aged 14 or less, and t− 1 = 1990, when those aged 15-24 were aged 14 or less.
The ratio
GDPs,T0
GDPd,T0
captures the ratio of per-capita GDP (PPP) across countries in a year
T0 that lies sufficiently far in the past to be plausibly exogenous (I use T0 = t − 3) The
variables τ isd refer to bilateral geographical and cultural distance measures. I use the logarithm
of the distance between two countries, a dummy variable indicating whether the countries
share a common border, a dummy variable for a colonial relationship, and a dummy variable
for sharing a common language. In the variables τ isd I also include dummy variables for the
presence of prior migration networks, which are known to be important enhancer of bilateral
migration (McKenzie and Rapoport, 2007; Beine, Docquier, and O¨zden, 2011; Docquier, Peri,
and Ruyssen, 2014). I rank country pairs according to their migration stock in 1960 and follow
Hanson and McIntosh (2016) in constructing indicators for belonging to the top 5%, top 20%,
and top 50% of this ranking. The interaction of the relative labor supply
(
ln
L0s,t−1
L0s,t−5
− ln L
0
d,t−1
L0d,t−5
)
with these distance and prior migration network indicators captures the intuition that a relative
abundance of labor will be more conducive to migration if bilateral migration costs are low.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 10 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1734
that I estimate is:
msd,2010 −msd,2000 = ηs + ηd + λ
(
ln
L0s,1990
L0s,1950
− ln L
0
d,1990
L0d,1950
)
+ κ
(
ln
GDPs,1970
GDPd,1970
)
+ γiτ
i
sd
+ φi
[(
ln
L0s,1990
L0s,1950
− ln L
0
d,1990
L0d,1950
)
× τ isd
]
+ sd. (2)
2.2 Derivation from the specification used by Hanson and McIntosh (2016)
Hanson and McIntosh (2016) divide the population into cohort-gender cells and specify a
relationship between the growth of cohort- and gender-specific migration rates, birth cohort
ratios, initial GDP ratios, and distance variables. Denote gender by g, a cohort by c, the source
country by s, and the destination country by d. Cohorts are defined by ten year intervals, e.g.
those aged 15–24, 25–34, 35–44, 45–54 in the year 2000. Time is denoted by t and measured
in decades. The specification with notation taken directly from Hanson and McIntosh (2016)
is
ygcsd,t+1 − ygcsd,t = δgc + δs + δd + α
(
ln
Lgcs,t
Lgcd,t
− ln Lgcs,t−1
Lgcd,t−1
)
+ β
(
ln
wcs,t
wcd,t
)
+ γτsd
+ ρ
[(
ln
Lgcs,t
Lgcd,t
− ln Lgcs,t−1
Lgcd,t−1
)
× τsd
]
+ εgcsd. (3)
The dependent variable is ygcsd,t+1−ygcsd,t, the change of the gender-cohort-specific emigration
rate over ten years. For example, the emigration rate to the US for Mexico-born men who were
aged 25–34 in 2010, minus that for those who were aged 15–24 in 2000. The variables δgc, δs,
and δd are gender-cohort, source country, and destination country dummies. The expression(
ln
Lgcs,t
Lgcd,t
− ln Lgcs,t−1Lgcd,t−1
)
measures the change in the relative size of gender and cohort-specific
birth-cohort ratios. For example, the log Mexico/US birth cohort ratios for men aged 15–24
in 2000 minus the log birth cohort ratio for men aged 15–24 in 1990. The ratio
wcs,t
wcd,t
captures
living standard differences at the start of a cohort’s life, which are proxied by relative per-capita
GDP measured in the year a cohort was aged 15 or less. Finally, τsd are distance variables,
such as geographical distance, common language, etc.2
2See Hanson and McIntosh (2016) for additional details on the definition of variables.
I estimate the model for t = 2000 and t + 1 = 2010 and use the estimated coefficients to
project migration thereafter. For clarity, and explicitly labeling time variables, the equation
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Starting from (3), for each gender g, I average over cohorts c = 1, . . . C to obtain
1
C
∑
c
ygcsd,t+1 − 1
C
∑
c
ygcsd,t =
1
C
∑
c
δgc + δs + δd + α
1
C
∑
c
(
ln
Lgcs,t
Lgcd,t
− ln Lgcs,t−1
Lgcd,t−1
)
+ β
1
C
∑
c
(
ln
wcs,t
wcd,t
)
+ γτsd
+ ρ
1
C
∑
c
[(
ln
Lgcs,t
Lgcd,t
− ln Lgcs,t−1
Lgcd,t−1
)
× τsd
]
+
1
C
∑
c
εgcsd. (4)
Using bars to denote averages, the equation can be expressed as
y¯gsd,t+1 − y¯gsd,t = δ¯g + δs + δd + α
C
∑
c
(
ln
Lgcs,t
Lgcd,t
− ln Lgcs,t−1
Lgcd,t−1
)
+ β
1
C
∑
c
(
ln
wcs,t
wcd,t
)
+ γτsd
+
ρ
C
∑
c
[(
ln
Lgcs,t
Lgcd,t
− ln Lgcs,t−1
Lgcd,t−1
)
× τsd
]
+ ε¯gsd. (5)
The next step to simplify this expression is to write out the summation
∑
c∈C
(
ln
Lgcs,t
Lgcd,t
− ln Lgcs,t−1Lgcd,t−1
)
and to note that it is equivalent to the difference in gender-specific population growth rates
between the sending and the destination countries over a 40-year period.
To exemplify, I focus on t = 2000 and t + 1 = 2010. In the year 2000, those who were aged
15–24, 25–34, 35–44, 45–54 were aged less than 14 in the years 1990, 1980, 1970, and 1960,
respectively. This is exemplified in the following table:
Age in 2000 Age in 2010 Aged 5–14 (“born”) in:
15–24 25–34 1990
25–34 35–44 1980
35–44 45–54 1970
45–54 55–64 1960
I use the notation L0gs,j for the cohort of gender g that was “born” (was aged less than 14) in
the year j in country s. As an example, using this notation, the birth cohort of those aged
15–24 in the year 2000 is Lg,15−24,s,2000 = L0gs,1990 and that of those aged 45–54 in the year
2000 is Lg,45−54,s,2000 = L0gs,1960.
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Summing over all cohorts c ∈ C ≡ {15− 24, 25− 34, 35− 44, 45− 54}:
∑
c∈C
(
ln
Lgcs,t
Lgcd,t
− ln Lgcs,t−1
Lgcd,t−1
)
=
1990∑
j=1960
(
ln
L0gs,j
L0gd,j
− ln L
0
gs,j−1
L0gd,j−1
)
= ln
L0gs,1990
L0gd,1990
− ln L
0
gs,1950
L0gd,1950
= ln
L0gs,1990
L0gs,1950
− ln L
0
gd,1990
L0gd,1950
(6)
The last expression is simply the difference across countries of growth rates of birth cohorts
between the years 1950 and 1990. It does not depend on the cohort structure, just on growth
in birth rates over four decades. This implies that, although variation across cohorts is used
in the identification of the coefficients, cross-cohort differences in population size (or any other
measure of the evolution of the population structure) are not used in the projection step when
the variable projected is an average over cohorts.
The elements in 1C
∑
c
(
ln
wcs,t
wcd,t
)
are log-ratios of (PPP-adjusted) per-capita GDP in the send-
ing and destination countries. These ratios are calculated for the year in which a cohort was
aged 14 or less. As with the birth cohorts, the year at which GDP ratios are measured for
those who in 2000 were aged 15–24, 25–34, 35–44, 45–54 are the years 1990, 1980, 1970, and
1960, respectively. The GDP-term is the average of four GDP ratios:
1
C
∑
c∈C
(
ln
wcs,t
wcd,t
)
=
1
4
1990∑
j=1960
(
ln
GDPs,j
GDPd,j
)
(7)
The resulting equation is:
y¯gsd,2010 − y¯gsd,2000 = δ˜g + δs + δd + α
C
(
ln
L0gs,1990
L0gs,1950
− ln L
0
gd,1990
L0gd,1950
)
+ β
1
4
1990∑
j=1960
(
ln
GDPs,j
GDPd,j
)
+ γτsd
+
ρ
C
[(
ln
L0gs,1990
L0gs,1950
− ln L
0
gd,1990
L0gd,1950
)
× τsd
]
+ ε¯gsd. (8)
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and males yields:
y¯sd,2010 − y¯sd,2000 = δ¯f + δ¯m
2
+ δs + δd
+
α
2C
(
ln
L0fs,1990
L0fs,1950
− ln L
0
fd,1990
L0fd,1950
+ ln
L0ms,1990
L0ms,1950
− ln L
0
md,1990
L0md,1950
)
+ β
1
4
1990∑
j=1960
(
ln
GDPs,j
GDPd,j
)
+ γτsd
+
ρ
2C
[(
ln
L0fs,1990
L0fs,1950
− ln L
0
fd,1990
L0fd,1950
+ ln
L0ms,1990
L0ms,1950
− ln L
0
md,1990
L0md,1950
)
× τsd
]
+
ε¯fsd + ε¯msd
2
, (9)
where y¯sd,2010− y¯sd,2000 is the growth of the average of the cohort- and gender-specific sending
out rates of the immigrant population between the years 2000 and 2010. In aggregate data
I only have access to the sending-out rate of the total population and its growth msd,2010 −
msd,2000. Because cohorts are not of the same size, in general, msd,2010 −msd,2000 = y¯sd,2010 −
y¯sd,2000. However, these two expressions differ by an error term es that is specific only to the
population structure in the source country (and does not depend on the destination country),
so that
msd,2010 −msd,2000 = y¯sd,2010 − y¯sd,2000 + es (10)
Using this result, the specification of Hanson and McIntosh (2016) averaged over cohorts and
genders turns out to be:
msd,2010 −msd,2000 = δ¯f + δ¯m
2
+ (δs − es) + δd
+
α
2C
(
ln
L0fs,1990
L0fs,1950
− ln L
0
fd,1990
L0fd,1950
+ ln
L0ms,1990
L0ms,1950
− ln L
0
md,1990
L0md,1950
)
+ β
1
4
1990∑
j=1960
(
ln
GDPs,j
GDPd,j
)
+ γτsd
+
ρ
2C
[(
ln
L0fs,1990
L0fs,1950
− ln L
0
fd,1990
L0fd,1950
+ ln
L0ms,1990
L0ms,1950
− ln L
0
md,1990
L0md,1950
)
× τsd
]
+
ε¯fsd + ε¯msd
2
. (11)
This equation is still distinguished by gender g = f,m. Averaging the equations for females
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simplified to
msd,2010 −msd,2000 = δ¯f + δ¯m
2
+ (δs − es) + δd
+
α
C
(
ln
L0s,1990
L0s,1950
− ln L
0
d,1990
L0d,1950
)
+ β
1
4
1990∑
j=1960
(
ln
GDPs,j
GDPd,j
)
+ γτsd
+
ρ
C
[(
ln
L0s,1990
L0s,1950
− ln L
0
d,1990
L0d,1950
)
× τsd
]
+
ε¯fsd + ε¯msd
2
. (12)
This can be written as
msd,2010 −msd,2000 = η + ηs + ηd
+ λ
(
ln
L0s,1990
L0s,1950
− ln L
0
d,1990
L0d,1950
)
+ β
1
4
1990∑
j=1960
(
ln
GDPs,j
GDPd,j
)
+ γτsd
+ φ
[(
ln
L0s,1990
L0s,1950
− ln L
0
d,1990
L0d,1950
)
× τsd
]
+ sd, (13)
where η =
δ¯f+δ¯m
2 , ηs = δs − es, ηd = δd, λ = αC , φ = ρC , and sd =
ε¯fsd+ε¯msd
2 .
Finally, because the average of the per-capita GDP ratio may be subject to reverse causality, it
is convenient to replace it with the per-capita GDP ratio for a year T0 that sufficiently far in the
past. The natural candidate is to use the year 1960. However, because of a wider availability
of data I use T0 = 1970. This year lies sufficiently far in the past to make the argument that
the change in the share of migrants between 2000 and 2010 does not affect GDP 30 or 40 years
before.
Moreover, because in practice the growth rates of females and males are almost identical,
so that ln
L0fs,1990
L0fs,1950
≈ ln L
0
ms,1990
L0ms,1950
and ln
L0fd,1990
L0fd,1950
≈ ln L
0
md,1990
L0md,1950
, the expression can be further be
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2010.3 I estimate the model by weighted least squares with weights given by population in the
source country. Past and projected birth cohort sizes are taken from the United Nations’World
Population Prospects. The 2015 Revision.4 I use the United Nations’ birth cohort estimates
for the period 1950–2010 and birth cohort forecasts for the period 2020-2050 (from the zero-
migration scenario). Based on the parameters estimated from the empirical model, I project
bilateral migration flows into the future until the year 2050 based on the change in birth cohort
sizes projected by the United Nations. I then recursively add up bilateral migration stocks
and consolidate them either at the source or destination country to obtain projected emigrant
or immigrant stocks. To obtain the best possible fit, I estimate an equation that jointly makes
use of all distance variables τ i and their interactions with relative birth cohort growth rates
and then project the change in the bilateral migration rate according to the expression:
(msd,t+1 −msd,t)̂ = ηˆs + ηˆd + λˆ
(
ln
L0s,t−1
L0s,t−5
− ln L
0
d,t−1
L0d,t−5
)
+ κˆ
(
ln
GDPs,t−3
GDPd,t−3
)
+
∑
i
γˆiτ
i
sd
+
∑
i
φˆi
[(
ln
L0s,t−1
L0s,t−5
− ln L
0
d,t−1
L0d,t−5
)
× τ isd
]
+ sd. (14)
I take GDP data from the Penn World Table (version 9.0). I use expenditure-side real GDP
(RGDP e), which, according to Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer (2015), is ideal to compare living
standards across countries and across years. I compute per-capita GDP using total population
counts for each country from the United Nations’ dataset rather than from the Penn World
Table to be consistent with the source for birth cohort sizes. For several countries the coverage
of GDP in the Penn World Table starts only in 1990. This is the case for countries that were
previously joined in the USSR, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. Because these countries have
important bilateral migration stocks, I impute relative GDP ratios in the pre-1990 years to be
able to use them in the projections.5 Specifically, for country pairs that include one of these
countries I set the GDP ratio in 1970 and in 1980 to the value it had in 1990. Bilateral distances
and all other geographical data used in the gravity equation are taken from the CEPII gravity
dataset by Head, Mayer, and Ries (2010).
3These databases are available at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/
global-bilateral-migration-database and http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/
Resources/334934-1110315015165/T1.Estimates_of_Migrant_Stocks_2010.xls. Both databases are ul-
timately based on national sources but differ in methodology. To the best of my knowledge, there has not been
a study on the relative data quality of these two sources.
4Available at https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/.
5As a robustness exercise, I also exclude countries with missing data and find similar results for countries
left in the sample.
2.3 Data sources and projection details
I use decennial bilateral migration stocks from the GBM database originally compiled by
O¨zden, Parsons, Schiff, and Walmsley (2011) until 2000 and the World Bank’s update for
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3 International migration patterns
In Table 1 I list the top 25 countries according to the number of international migrants residing
in that country. The data are from the World Bank’s Global Bilateral Migration Database
for the year 2010.6 The United States stands out as the country with the highest number of
immigrants, at over 40 million people, representing 20.7% of the total of all migrants in the
world. It is noteworthy that there are three countries in the top ten of migration destinations
that are not OECD destinations: Russia, Saudi Arabia, and India. In the whole table this
number swells to 14 countries out of the 25 top migration destinations.
This raises the issue of the importance of including non-OECD destinations in the estimation
of the empirical gravity model. The estimations by Hanson and McIntosh (2016) exclude all
non-OECD countries as potential destinations because their dataset (DIOC) is constructed
only from censuses of OECD countries. The omission of large destination countries may affect
the overall projections, even for countries that are OECD members by biasing the coefficients
used in the projections.
The high number of migrants in countries that were formally part of the USSR is noteworthy.
Among those countries, Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan exhibit large numbers of immigrants
and all three of them show up in the top 25 destinations. The large current migration counts can
be traced back to people that were forcibly resettled when the USSR was in existence, people
who returned to their ancestral homeland after the fall of the USSR (but who are counted
as migrants because of their place of birth), and economic migration due to the booming
economies in Russia and Kazakhstan after the collapse of the USSR.
In terms of origin, most countries in the top 25 (Table 2) are developing or emerging countries.
Mexico is the largest source of international migrants, followed closely by India and Russia.
Migrants of Mexican origin number 11.9 million, representing 10% of Mexico’s resident popula-
tion, and Mexican migrants make up 6.1% of all migrants in the dataset. Virtually all Mexican
emigrants reside in the USA.
Table 3 shows the top 25 pairs of source and destination countries. The largest bilateral
migration flow is that of Mexicans residing in the USA. At 11.6 million people, the Mexican
diaspora in the USA amounts to 6% of the total number of migrants in the world. Table 3 also
reveals several bidirectional migration relationships. For example, those between Russia and
Ukraine (in positions 2 and 3), Russia and Kazakhstan (positions 6 and 7), and Bangladesh and
India (positions 4 and 24). These bilateral relationships are influenced by historical and cultural
ties, as well as by geographical proximity, underscoring the appropriateness of a gravity-style
model to explain the bilateral migration patterns in the data.
6The criterion for being classified as a migrant in that database is according to country of birth, not nation-
ality.
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Table 1: Top 25 destination countries in 2010
Destination country Migrants % of Destination % of all Migrants
(thousands) population in data
1 United States of America 40,154 13.0% 20.7%
2 Russian Federation 11,793 8.2% 6.1%
3 Germany 9,784 12.2% 5.1%
4 Saudi Arabia 7,289 25.9% 3.8%
5 Canada 7,027 20.6% 3.6%
6 Spain 6,892 14.8% 3.6%
7 United Kingdom 6,788 10.8% 3.5%
8 France 6,595 10.5% 3.4%
9 Australia 5,441 24.6% 2.8%
10 India 5,337 0.4% 2.8%
11 Ukraine 4,932 10.8% 2.5%
12 Italy 4,379 7.3% 2.3%
13 United Arab Emirates 3,293 39.5% 1.7%
14 Kazakhstan 3,071 18.8% 1.6%
15 Jordan 2,957 45.4% 1.5%
16 Israel 2,724 36.7% 1.4%
17 Coˆte d’Ivoire 2,366 11.8% 1.2%
18 Malaysia 2,301 8.2% 1.2%
19 Hong Kong 2,296 32.8% 1.2%
20 Japan 2,176 1.7% 1.1%
21 Iran 2,108 2.8% 1.1%
22 Singapore 1,879 37.0% 1.0%
23 South Africa 1,863 3.6% 1.0%
24 Netherlands 1,599 9.6% 0.8%
25 Kuwait 1,572 51.4% 0.8%
Source: own calculations from the Bilateral Migration Matrix (World Bank) for 2010.
Notes: countries that are not members of the OECD are marked in bold.
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Table 2: Top 25 origin countries in 2010
Origin country Migrants % of Origin % of all Migrants
(thousands) population in data
1 Mexico 11,852 10.0% 6.1%
2 India 11,053 0.9% 5.7%
3 Russian Federation 10,090 7.0% 5.2%
4 China 8,218 0.6% 4.2%
5 Ukraine 6,002 13.1% 3.1%
6 Bangladesh 4,961 3.3% 2.6%
7 United Kingdom 4,548 7.3% 2.3%
8 Pakistan 4,522 2.7% 2.3%
9 Turkey 4,239 5.9% 2.2%
10 Philippines 4,213 4.5% 2.2%
11 Egypt 3,565 4.3% 1.8%
12 Germany 3,402 4.2% 1.8%
13 Italy 3,359 5.6% 1.7%
14 Kazakhstan 3,340 20.5% 1.7%
15 Poland 3,067 8.0% 1.6%
16 Morocco 3,014 9.4% 1.6%
17 Romania 2,765 13.6% 1.4%
18 State of Palestine 2,707 66.5% 1.4%
19 Indonesia 2,321 1.0% 1.2%
20 United States of America 2,272 0.7% 1.2%
21 Viet Nam 2,201 2.5% 1.1%
22 Portugal 2,139 20.2% 1.1%
23 Afghanistan 2,135 7.6% 1.1%
24 Republic of Korea 2,033 4.1% 1.1%
25 Colombia 2,018 4.4% 1.0%
Source: own calculations from the Bilateral Migration Matrix (World Bank) for 2010.
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Table 3: Top 25 cross-country migrant counts in 2010
Destination country Origin country Migrants % of all Migrants
(thousands) in data
1 United States of America Mexico 11,636 6.0%
2 Ukraine Russian Federation 3,684 1.9%
3 Russian Federation Ukraine 3,647 1.9%
4 India Bangladesh 3,299 1.7%
5 Germany Turkey 2,733 1.4%
6 Russian Federation Kazakhstan 2,648 1.4%
7 Kazakhstan Russian Federation 2,227 1.2%
8 Hong Kong China 2,225 1.1%
9 United Arab Emirates India 2,186 1.1%
10 United States of America China 1,736 0.9%
11 United States of America Philippines 1,718 0.9%
12 Iran Afghanistan 1,704 0.9%
13 United States of America India 1,654 0.9%
14 United States of America Puerto Rico 1,651 0.9%
15 Syrian Arab Republic State of Palestine 1,541 0.8%
16 Saudi Arabia India 1,453 0.8%
17 Malaysia Indonesia 1,398 0.7%
18 Coˆte d’Ivoire Burkina Faso 1,311 0.7%
19 Australia United Kingdom 1,208 0.6%
20 United States of America Viet Nam 1,160 0.6%
21 India Pakistan 1,151 0.6%
22 United States of America El Salvador 1,116 0.6%
23 Singapore Malaysia 1,061 0.5%
24 Bangladesh India 1,053 0.5%
25 United States of America Republic of Korea 1,051 0.5%
Source: own calculations from the Bilateral Migration Matrix (World Bank) for 2010.
Table 3 also shows the preeminence of the USA as the main recipient of migrants from many
developing around the world. The USA shows up eight times as a destination in the top 25
origin-destination pairs and is in many cases the top destination for emigrants from particular
countries. Behind Mexico (position 1 in the ranking), migrants in the USA originate predomi-
nantly from China (position 10), Philippines (position 11), India (position 13), and Puerto Rico
(position 14). The table also shows that India is important as the provider of large numbers
of international migrants to several countries, as it shows up four times in the top 25 list.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 20 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1734
4 Results
The gravity equation provides a good fit for changes in bilateral migration. Table 4 con-
tains the outcome of trying out various specifications and exhibits a robust relationship be-
tween migration and the distance variables and their interaction with the labor ratio change(
ln
L0s,t−1
L0s,t−5
− ln L
0
d,t−1
L0d,t−5
)
that captures relative population pressures. This Table is the equivalent
to Table 2 of Hanson and McIntosh (2016) but estimated for the specification in (2) on migra-
tion data from the GBM database. Column 1 in Table 4 shows the estimates of the coefficients
in the gravity equation in a specification without any interaction terms. As expected, greater
distance reduces migration and a common border and a common language enhance migration
flows. A common colonial relationship does not by itself lead to higher bilateral migration.
The main variable of interest, the labor ratio change, although not significantly different from
zero, has the expected sign. This contrasts with the results by Hanson and McIntosh (2016),
who found a counter-intuitive significant negative effect of labor abundance on migration.
Columns 2 through 5 show specifications that add interactions between the change in the labor
ratio with the different distance variables. The results indicate that if two countries share a
common language or a former colonial relationship, then a change in the relative supply of labor
in the source country translates into more bilateral migration to the destination country. The
point estimates for geographical distance and a common border also indicate an enhancement of
the effect of changes in the labor share in the expected direction, although they are imprecisely
estimated. Columns 6 through 8 contain the results of including the indicators for the presence
of past migration. Migration networks enhance the effect of changes in the labor force. The
effect is stronger for stricter cutoffs in the prior migration indicator. So, the effect of changes
in the labor ratio doubles when a source-destination country pair is in the top 20% relative to
the top 50% of the ranking of 1960 migration networks. For the top 5%, the point estimator
is three times as large as for the top 20%. F-tests at the bottom of the table show that in the
specifications with interactions in Columns 4 through 8 the effect of the labor ratio change is
significantly positive at the 10% level (and in three cases also at the 5% level).
By including all covariates in a single regression, I estimate the specification that I use to
project bilateral migration changes into the future.7 Armed with these estimates, I first com-
pute the number of immigrants residing in the seven OECD countries studied by Hanson and
McIntosh (2016) and plot them in Figure 1. According to these projections, the USA and
Spain experience the largest increases in their immigrant counts, followed by Italy, the UK,
and France. Germany is projected to experience a decline in its immigrant stock and the pro-
jection for Japan is mostly flat. In the case of Spain, the inclusion of the years prior to 2000
7The estimated coefficients used for the projection are shown in Table 5, Column (3), in Appendix A.
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Table 4: Interaction Effects of Labor Ratio Growth on Migration Flows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Without Geographical Geographical Geographical Geographical Past migration Past migration Past migration
VARIABLES Interactions Interactions Interactions Interactions Interactions Interactions Interactions Interactions
Labor Ratio Chg. 0.012 0.073 0.011 0.009 0.002 0.011 0.009 0.012
(0.013) (0.057) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
Per-capita GDP ratio -0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Per-capita GDP ratio squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log distance -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.007** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.004** -0.005** -0.005**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Common border 0.029* 0.030* 0.043 0.030* 0.028* 0.022* 0.025* 0.024*
(0.015) (0.016) (0.031) (0.016) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Colonial relationship -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 0.001 -0.003 -0.006 -0.009 -0.009
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
Common language 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.018***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Top 5% 0.028 0.019 0.016
(0.031) (0.027) (0.026)
Top 20% 0.014*** 0.012** 0.013**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Top 50% 0.001 -0.000 0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Labor Ratio Chg. × Log distance -0.007
(0.006)
Labor Ratio Chg. × Common border 0.072
(0.086)
Labor Ratio Chg. × Colonial relationship 0.038**
(0.019)
Labor Ratio Chg. × Common language 0.026***
(0.008)
Labor Ratio Chg. × Top 5% 0.139*
(0.072)
Labor Ratio Chg. × Top 20% 0.034**
(0.013)
Labor Ratio Chg. × Top 50% 0.016***
(0.005)
Observations 15,122 15,122 15,122 15,122 15,122 15,122 15,122 15,122
R-squared 0.060 0.061 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.071 0.064 0.063
F test: Labor Ratio Chg + Interaction = 0 1.652 0.876 4.343 3.626 4.063 4.956 3.482
F test p-value 0.199 0.349 0.0372 0.0569 0.0439 0.0260 0.0621
Notes: The dependent variable is the bilateral migration flow between two countries. All regressions include origin and destination country dummies (not shown) and are estimated
by least squares weighted by population in the source country. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** represents 1% significance, ** 5% significance, and * 10% significance.
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in the figure reveals that the growth in the migrant stock was unusually high between 2000
and 2010, in part because of the booming economy in the years prior to the Great Recession.
Because the projections rely on the growth rate of migrants between only these two years,
there is reason to suspect that the model is overestimating the growth of migrants in Spain.
For the other countries, change between 2000 and 2010 does not fall out of the ordinary when
compared to the prior decades.
Figure 1: Past number of immigrants and projections for selected OECD destinations. Data until
2010 are from the GBM database. For later years, the figure plots the projected number of immigrants
obtained from the projection equation in (14) aggregated by destination country. Projections are obtained
for the whole sample but only selected OECD destinations are shown.
4.1 Comparison with the projections by Hanson and McIntosh (2016)
In Figure 2 I compare my projections with those from Hanson and McIntosh (2016), who use
only the OECD destination countries available in the OECD’s DIOC database. Their definition
of the population refers to the population aged 15–54 because their cohort-based methodology
allows them to make projections only for this population group. This implies that the scales are
not directly comparable. A major qualitative difference that is immediately apparent from the
comparison of Figures 2a and 2b is that for the USA the projection of immigrants keeps rising
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(a) GBM Database (World Bank)
(b) DIOC Database (OECD)
(c) GBM Database restricted to countries in DIOC
Figure 2: Past number of immigrants and projections for selected OECD destinations: comparison
with the results by Hanson and McIntosh (2016), who use the DIOC database. Data for subfigure (b)
are taken directly from Hanson and McIntosh (2016). In subfigures (a) and (c), data until 2010 are
from the GBM database. For later years, the figure plots the projected number of immigrants obtained
from the projection equation in (14) aggregated by destination country. Projections are obtained for
the whole sample but only selected OECD destinations are shown. Subfigures (a) and (c) plot the total
number of migrants and subfigure (b) only those aged 15–54.
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over the next decades when the GBM Database is used and stagnates with the estimation that
uses only the limited set of destination countries included in the DIOC database. The levels
of the projections for the other countries are ranked roughly similarly in both figures although
they differ in the evolution. Among these differences, Spain exhibits a stronger growth rate in
my estimation using the GBM database and the stocks of projected immigrants for the rest
of the countries do not fan out as much as time progresses, as they do in the projections by
Hanson and McIntosh (2016). The projections for Germany and Japan, although they decrease
or stay constant in both figures, do not turn negative in my estimation using GBM data.
There are several factors that might influence the differences in the projections. The first of
these factors is in the empirical approach: I rely on variation across country-pairs to identify
the effects of the explanatory variables whereas Hanson and McIntosh (2016) rely on variation
across country-pairs and cohorts. Second, and related to this, the population for whom Hanson
and McIntosh (2016) produce projections is only a subset of the total population. The third
factor is in the coverage of countries in the bilateral migration datasets: the DIOC database
covers only OECD destinations and the GBM database all countries. Finally, the source data
used by the DIOC database do not always coincide with those of the GBM database. It is not
possible to give a conclusive answer to how each of these factors affects the projections, and it
is also not the purpose of this paper.
One aspect that can be studied with some detail is the coverage of different destination coun-
tries. In Figure 2c I have repeated the projection exercise by estimating the main specification
using data from the GBM database but only for destination countries that are available in the
DIOC database. With this restriction, immigrants in the USA approach a peak of 46 million
in 2030 and stay around that level thereafter. This resembles the evolution of the stock of im-
migrants in the results by Hanson and McIntosh (2016). For all countries shown, the projected
stock of migrants is systematically lower. In fact, the number of immigrants turns negative in
some of them, as it does in the results by Hanson and McIntosh (2016): in Japan the number
of immigrants turns negative by 2030 and in Germany and the UK by 2040. This suggests that
the expansion of the dataset to non-OECD countries produces higher estimates in developed
countries. A potential explanation for this result is that the estimation for the reduced set
of countries available in DIOC places stronger weight on the change in the labor ratio and
its interactions with the geographical and cultural distance parameters.8 Because birth rates
of source countries tend to converge to those of developed countries in the United Nation’s
projections, the DIOC sample therefore predicts lower flows of migrants in future decades.
8These coefficients are shown in Column 4 of Table 5 (Appendix A). Coefficients involving the labor share
are uniformly larger (in absolute value) in Column 4 than the coefficients in Column 3 that were estimated
using GBM data, with the exception of the top 20% indicator.
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4.2 Projections for non-OECD destination countries and total world mi-
grants
Because the GBM sample includes virtually all countries in the world, it is possible to construct
projections for non-OECD destinations with important immigrant stocks and also for the whole
world.
In Figure 3 I plot the projected stocks of immigrants in several non-OECD countries. Figure 3a
depicts the projected number of immigrants in the three former USSR countries that appear as
major destinations in Table 1. The stock of immigrants in Russia and Ukraine is projected to
remain fairly constant at around 12 million in Russia and 5 million in Ukraine. On the other
hand, the stock of immigrants in Kazakhstan is projected to increase by 50% from 3 million
in 2010 to 4.5 million by 2050. This is explained by growth in per-capita GDP over the period
1990-2010 as well as low projected birth rates in Kazakhstan.
(a) former USSR (b) India and Southeast Asia
(c) Sub-Saharan Africa (d) Latin America
Figure 3: Past number of immigrants and projections for selected non-OECD destinations. Data until
2010 are from the GBM database. For later years, the figure plots the projected number of immigrants
obtained from the projection equation in (14) aggregated by destination country.
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In Figure 3b I plot the number of projected immigrants in selected Asian countries. Immigrants
are projected to increase in all countries except India. In fact, the large projected population
increase coupled with an important immigrant presence base in several destination countries,
make India one of the main sources of emigrants in the future. Figure 3c shows projected im-
migrant stocks in Sub-Saharan Africa. South Africa is projected to experience the largest surge
of immigrants, although this may be influenced by the particularly large growth of immigrants
between 2000 and 2010, the years that are used to fit the estimation. The other countries
exhibit more moderate but positive growth of immigrants, many of whom are attracted from
other countries in the region. Finally, Figure 3d shows projected immigrant stocks for Latin
America. The stock of immigrants in Argentina is projected to fall in future decades, falling
almost to zero. The lower birth rates in Argentina’s traditional sources if immigrants and its
lagging per-capita GDP make this country less likely to receive new immigrant flows. Brazil
is projected to turn around the decreasing trend prior to 2010. This is, in part, explained
by its lower projected birth rates. In Mexico, growth in its per-capita GDP and the transi-
tion to lower population growth make this country an important destination for international
migration.
Because all countries are included in the estimation and projection step, it is also possible
to sum migrants across destinations to obtain the total number of migrants in the world. In
Figure 4 I plot the projection of migrants in millions of people and as a percentage of projected
world population. The total stock of migrants is projected to grow from 190 million in 2010
to 334 million in 2050. In terms of the projected world population, the stock of international
migrants stood at 2.8% in 2010 and is projected to rise over the next 40 years, to 2.9% in 2020,
3.1% in 2030, 3.3% in 2040, and 3.5% in 2050.
The forecasts can also be cumulated according to region of origin. In Figure 5 I show the
projections of emigrants for major regions were migrants originate from. In the panel on
the left I plot absolute numbers and in the panel on the right emigrants as a percentage of
the population residing in a particular region. From Figure 5b it is apparent that none of
the three regions in which emigrants represent close to 10% of the resident population are
projected to increase this share significantly. In the case of Mexico and the former USSR
countries, the share of emigrants increases only slightly over the years. For Eastern Europe
(excluding former USSR countries), the share drops to below 8% by 2050. Sub-Saharan Africa
and India are projected to increase the share of emigrants, although from low initial numbers.
These two origins, because of their strong projected population growth, feature large increases
in the number of migrants. So, emigrants from countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are projected
to grow from 19 million in 2010 to 78 million in 2050. Part of them migrate to other countries
in Sub-Saharan Africa, such as South Africa. Emigrants from India are projected to increase
from 11 million in 2010 to over 40 million by 2050.
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Figure 4: Number of migrants and their percentage of total world population. Data until 2010 are
from the GBM database. For later years, the figure plots the projected number of migrants (and their
percentage of world population) obtained from the projection equation in (14) aggregated for the whole
world.
(a) Millions of emigrants (b) In % of population
Figure 5: Past and projected total number and percentage of emigrants for major regions of origin.
Data until 2010 are from the GBM database. For later years, the figure plots the projected number of
emigrants obtained from the projection equation in (14) aggregated by major region of origin in (a) and
their percentage of total regional population in (b).
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Emigrants from countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) are projected to
decrease until 2020, both as a percentage of population and in total numbers and to increase
thereafter. Emigrants from Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) excluding Mexico are
also projected to increase starting in 2020. Although they represent a smaller fraction of the
population than in Mexico, emigrants from the rest of Latin America exceed those of Mexico in
total numbers. Their growth rate in absolute numbers is also bigger. Emigrants from Mexico
are projected to grow from close to 12 million in 2010 to 18 million in 2050 whereas those from
the rest of LAC are projected to grow by 50% from close to 20 million to 30 million by 2050.
5 Usage and intepretation of the projections
The projections for international migration are based on population pressures, that are rela-
tively easy to forecast. However, trends in bilateral migration flows are affected not only by
population pressures but also by immigration policies and economic and socio-demographic
disparities between nations that are not captured by geographical and cultural distance vari-
ables (Grogger and Hanson, 2011; Belot and Hatton, 2012). This implies that the projections
in this paper should not be interpreted as predictions or forecasts. Rather, they are the best
possible projection using a restricted set of variables that capture population pressures and
their interaction with geography, and users of these projections should be aware that changes
in immigration policies may substantially modify the evolution of migration projected from
population pressures.
The upside of including only the limited set of variables describing population pressures is that
projections of international migration pressures are based on a minimal set of assumptions on
the underlying determinants of migration. In the case of per-capita GDP, the variable is lagged
by 40 years, so that projections until 2050 do not require to obtain forecasts on this variable.
The only variable needed to project migration is the evolution of population growth, which is
projected by the United Nations from fertility and mortality rates.
It could be the case that a user of this methodology wishes to include policy variables, such
as immigration policies in receiving countries, in the projections. Provided that it is possible
to observe changes in these policy variables between 2000 and 2010, the methodology used in
this paper allows for the inclusion of these policy variables by adding them as an additional
regressor. Ideally, because of the likely endogeneity of these policy variables, the specification
should be estimated by instrumenting the changes in the policy variables with appropriately
exogenous variables.
A further caveat of these projections, one that was mentioned in passing in Section 4, is that if
a country-pair experienced an atypical high or low growth in the number of migrants between
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2000 and 2010, then this may produce persistent high or low flows in the projections. If, as
occurred to Spain, the number of immigrants from virtually all origins experiences atypical
high positive inflows between 2000 and 2010, then the estimation will place a high value on the
destination fixed-effect ηd in the case of Spain. This will in turn imply high projected inflows
for Spain in all future years. A useful way to detect such a case is to plot prior years, as I did for
the case of Spain, in order to spot sudden changes in the 2000-2010 flow that may be indicative
of an atypical observation. Once such an atypical situation is detected there are three possible
ways of proceeding. The first is to simply treat the estimation for that particular country
with care, noting that the projection is likely to be biased by the atypical value, as I did for
Spain and South Africa in Section 4. A second approach is to try to replace migrant flows for
the affected country with external estimates of what the number of migrants would have been
in absence of the atypical situation. Finally, a third possibility would be to identify affected
countries by a dummy variable to attempt to identify the partial effect of the reason behind the
atypical growth, such as a booming economy. In the projections, this dummy variable would
then be set to zero for all future years. However, for this last approach to work, the effect of
a booming economy would need to be comparable across the different countries. Rather than
attempting any of these alternative solutions, I leave them for future work and simply report
the likely problematic cases.
An additional extension that is left for future work is to try out different population growth
scenarios and gauge their impact on projected migration. The United Nations’ high and
low fertility scenarios, which imply level effects for all countries in the world, could be used.
Alternatively, it is also possible to increase or decrease birth cohort sizes used as inputs for
a particular country. The methodology in this paper allows to trace how larger population
growth in a particular country or region impacts international migration at the global level.
6 Conclusion
In this paper I extend the methodology by Hanson and McIntosh (2016) to construct projec-
tions for international migration for all countries in the world, including non-OECD destina-
tion countries. I show that non-OECD countries are important destinations for international
migration, and this calls for a projection methodology that includes these countries. The
specification I estimate is formally implied by that of Hanson and McIntosh (2016). I show
that, although they use variation across cohorts to identify the coefficients in the empirical
relationship, this variation is not required for the projection phase. Moreover, the absence
of cohort-specific parameters in the projection step also implies that the estimation step can
be performed without relying on variation across cohorts, and exploiting just variation across
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country pairs instead. The loss of the cohort dimension in the estimation step is countered by
a larger number of destination countries, and therefore more country pair observations, leading
to a similar number of observations overall.
One advantage of using a larger set of destination countries is that projections can be made for
non-OECD countries and for the world as a whole. A second advantage is that estimates are
refined by the inclusion of non-OECD countries that are systematically excluded as destination
countries if the DIOC database is used. For example, I find that including these additional
destination countries lowers the effect of the labor ratio on migration. Because of this impact
on the estimates of coefficients, the inclusion of non-OECD countries also affects the projection
for OECD countries. For the US, I find that immigration does not stagnate at its current level
but keeps increasing throughout the projection horizon once non-OECD destination countries
are taken into account in the estimation.
The projections obtained rely on a very limited set of variables that are relatively easy to
project themselves (or are sufficiently lagged to remove the need for projecting them). This
makes using the projection methodology in this paper very appealing, especially given the
scarcity of data in developing countries. Potential uses of the methodology in this paper include
constructing population scenarios and thus calculating long-term potential growth rates in any
given country of the world. In doing this, the issues and caveats discussed in Section 5 should
be kept in mind when using the projection methodology.
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Appendix A: Additional tables
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Table 5: Regressions used to predict migration flows
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES GBM DIOC GBM DIOC
Labor Ratio Chg. 0.056*** 0.413*** 0.015 0.323**
(0.017) (0.140) (0.041) (0.133)
Per-capita GDP ratio -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.003
(0.002) (0.011) (0.002) (0.008)
Per-capita GDP ratio squared 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.002)
Log distance -0.008*** -0.022*** -0.004* -0.007
(0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.008)
Common border 0.029* 0.016 0.029 0.045
(0.015) (0.082) (0.028) (0.085)
Colonial relationship -0.003 -0.005 -0.006 -0.037
(0.018) (0.042) (0.021) (0.043)
Common language 0.018*** 0.058*** 0.016*** 0.043***
(0.004) (0.016) (0.004) (0.016)
Top 5% 0.028 -0.011
(0.029) (0.044)
Top 20% 0.012* 0.026***
(0.006) (0.010)
Top 50% 0.001 -0.003
(0.004) (0.007)
Labor Ratio Chg. × Log distance 0.001 -0.021**
(0.004) (0.010)
Labor Ratio Chg. × Common border 0.035 0.096
(0.076) (0.321)
Labor Ratio Chg. × Colonial relationship -0.004 0.001
(0.025) (0.044)
Labor Ratio Chg. × Common language 0.019** 0.037
(0.008) (0.025)
Labor Ratio Chg. × Top 5% 0.123* 0.184
(0.068) (0.117)
Labor Ratio Chg. × Top 20% 0.007 -0.011
(0.009) (0.016)
Labor Ratio Chg. × Top 50% 0.003 0.007
(0.005) (0.006)
Observations 15,122 4,384 15,122 4,384
R-squared 0.064 0.079 0.076 0.095
Notes: Column (3) exhibits the coefficients of the specification used to predict bilateral migration flows.
Column (4) exhibits the coefficients of the regression that restricts destination countries to those available
in the DIOC database. Columns (1) and (2) exhibit regressions without interactions for comparison. All
regressions include origin and destination dummy variables (not shown) and are estimated by least squares
weighted by population in the source country. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** represents 1%
significance, ** 5% siginficance, and * 10% significance.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA PUBLICATIONS 
WORKING PAPERS  
1621  ADRIAN VAN RIXTEL, LUNA ROMO GONZÁLEZ and JING YANG: The determinants of long-term debt issuance by 
European banks: evidence of two crises.
1622  JAVIER ANDRÉS, ÓSCAR ARCE and CARLOS THOMAS: When fi scal consolidation meets private deleveraging.
1623  CARLOS SANZ: The effect of electoral systems on voter turnout: evidence from a natural experiment.
1624  GALO NUÑO and CARLOS THOMAS: Optimal monetary policy with heterogeneous agents.
1625  MARÍA DOLORES GADEA, ANA GÓMEZ-LOSCOS and ANTONIO MONTAÑÉS: Oil price and economic growth: 
a long story?
1626  PAUL DE GRAUWE and EDDIE GERBA: Stock market cycles and supply side dynamics: two worlds, one vision?
1627 RICARDO GIMENO and EVA ORTEGA: The evolution of infl ation expectations in euro area markets.
1628 SUSANA PÁRRAGA RODRÍGUEZ: The dynamic effect of public expenditure shocks in the United States.
1629 SUSANA PÁRRAGA RODRÍGUEZ: The aggregate effects of government incometransfer shocks - EU evidence.
1630  JUAN S. MORA-SANGUINETTI, MARTA MARTÍNEZ-MATUTE and MIGUEL GARCÍA-POSADA: Credit, crisis 
and contract enforcement: evidence from the Spanish loan market.
1631  PABLO BURRIEL and ALESSANDRO GALESI: Uncovering the heterogeneous effects of ECB unconventional 
monetary policies across euro area countries.
1632  MAR DELGADO TÉLLEZ, VÍCTOR D. LLEDÓ and JAVIER J. PÉREZ: On the determinants of fi scal non-compliance: 
an empirical analysis of Spain’s regions.
1633  OMAR RACHEDI: Portfolio rebalancing and asset pricing with heterogeneous inattention.
1634  JUAN DE LUCIO, RAÚL MÍNGUEZ, ASIER MINONDO and FRANCISCO REQUENA: The variation of export prices 
across and within fi rms.
1635  JUAN FRANCISCO JIMENO, AITOR LACUESTA, MARTA MARTÍNEZ-MATUTE and ERNESTO VILLANUEVA: 
Education, labour market experience and cognitive skills: evidence from PIAAC.
1701  JAVIER ANDRÉS, JAVIER J. PÉREZ and JUAN A. ROJAS: Implicit public debt thresholds: an empirical exercise 
for the case of Spain.
1702  LUIS J. ÁLVAREZ: Business cycle estimation with high-pass and band-pass local polynomial regression.
1703  ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO, PAUL ALLISON and RICHARD WILLIAMS: Dynamic panel data modelling using maximum 
likelihood: an alternative to Arellano-Bond.
1704  MIKEL BEDAYO: Creating associations as a substitute for direct bank credit. Evidence from Belgium.
1705  MARÍA DOLORES GADEA-RIVAS, ANA GÓMEZ-LOSCOS and DANILO LEIVA-LEON: The evolution of regional 
economic interlinkages in Europe.
1706  ESTEBAN GARCÍA-MIRALLES: The crucial role of social welfare criteria for optimal inheritance taxation.
1707  MÓNICA CORREA-LÓPEZ and RAFAEL DOMÉNECH: Service regulations, input prices and export volumes: evidence 
from a panel of manufacturing fi rms.
1708  MARÍA DOLORES GADEA, ANA GÓMEZ-LOSCOS and GABRIEL PÉREZ-QUIRÓS: Dissecting US recoveries.
1709  CARLOS SANZ: Direct democracy and government size: evidence from Spain.
1710  HENRIQUE S. BASSO and JAMES COSTAIN: Fiscal delegation in a monetary union: instrument assignment 
and stabilization properties.
1711 IVÁN KATARYNIUK and JAIME MARTÍNEZ-MARTÍN: TFP growth and commodity prices in emerging economies.
1712  SEBASTIAN GECHERT, CHRISTOPH PAETZ and PALOMA VILLANUEVA: Top-down vs. bottom-up? Reconciling 
the effects of tax and transfer shocks on output.
1713  KNUT ARE AASTVEIT, FRANCESCO FURLANETTO and FRANCESCA LORIA: Has the Fed responded to house 
and stock prices? A time-varying analysis.
1714  FÁTIMA HERRANZ GONZÁLEZ and CARMEN MARTÍNEZ-CARRASCAL: The impact of fi rms’ fi nancial position on 
fi xed investment and employment. An analysis for Spain.
1715  SERGIO MAYORDOMO, ANTONIO MORENO, STEVEN ONGENA and MARÍA RODRÍGUEZ-MORENO: “Keeping it 
personal” or “getting real”? On the drivers and effectiveness of personal versus real loan guarantees.
1716  FRANCESCO FURLANETTO and ØRJAN ROBSTAD: Immigration and the macroeconomy: some new empirical evidence.
1717  ALBERTO FUERTES: Exchange rate regime and external adjustment: an empirical investigation for the U.S.
1718  CRISTINA GUILLAMÓN, ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO and SERGIO PUENTE: High growth fi rms in employment and 
productivity: dynamic interactions and the role of fi nancial constraints.
1719  PAULO SOARES ESTEVES and ELVIRA PRADES: On domestic demand and export performance in the euro area 
countries: does export concentration matter?
1720  LUIS J. ÁLVAREZ and ANA GÓMEZ-LOSCOS: A menu on output gap estimation methods.
1721  PAULA GIL, FRANCISCO MARTÍ, JAVIER J. PÉREZ, ROBERTO RAMOS and RICHARD MORRIS: The output effects 
of tax changes: narrative evidence from Spain.
1722  RICARDO GIMENO and ALFREDO IBÁÑEZ: The eurozone (expected) infl ation: an option’s eyes view.
1723  MIGUEL ANTÓN, SERGIO MAYORDOMO and MARÍA RODRÍGUEZ-MORENO: Dealing with dealers: sovereign 
CDS comovements.
1724  JOSÉ MANUEL MONTERO: Pricing decisions under fi nancial frictions: evidence from the WDN survey.
1725 MARIO ALLOZA: The impact of taxes on income mobility.
1726  DANILO LEIVA-LEON: Measuring business cycles intra-synchronization in US: a regime-switching interdependence 
framework.
1727  PIERRE GUÉRIN and DANILO LEIVA-LEON: Model averaging in Markov-Switching models: predicting national 
recessions with regional data .
1728  MÁXIMO CAMACHO and DANILO LEIVA-LEON: The propagation of industrial business cycles.
1729  JAMES COSTAIN: Costly decisions and sequential bargaining.
1730  MARIO ALLOZA: Is fi scal policy more effective in uncertain times or during recessions?
1731 PIERRE GUÉRIN and DANILO LEIVA-LEON: Monetary policy, stock market and sectoral comovement. 
1732  HENRIK JENSEN, IVAN PETRELLA, SØREN HOVE RAVN and EMILIANO SANTORO: Leverage and deepening 
business cycle skewness.
1733  CÉSAR MARTÍN MACHUCA: External stress early warning indicators.
1734  RODOLFO G. CAMPOS: International migration pressures in the long run.
Unidad de Servicios Auxiliares
Alcalá, 48 - 28014 Madrid
E-mail: publicaciones@bde.es
www.bde.es
